its conceptual load in a religious dimension is determined. In the presentation of the main text the significant moments of the sacred history of the universe and humanity in Mormonism are characterized, which is important for ontological studies of the doctrine. Researches are accompanied by a comparative analysis of the ontological doctrine of the LDS Church and philosophical systems that directly or indirectly influenced the formation of the Mormon world, in particular the monodology of Leibniz, the root causes of Aristotle, and the ideas of Plato. Along with this, the specificity of the monotheism of the Mormon doctrine and its distinction from other monotheistic beliefs is determined. The following fundamental ontological categories are considered: motion, time, space, spirit, matter through the prism of the Mormon worldview. Specificity of the perception of the Trinity in the teaching of the Mormons is given through the features of the ontological understanding of the nature of God and his materiality. The research deals with such controversial topics as spiritual matter, eternal and immortal bodies, three kingdoms of glory and matter of chaos. The main points of premortal life of people and the creation of the world through the ordering of chaos are outlined.

**Keywords:** the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Mormons, ontology, ontological doctrine, monotheism, movement, matter, spirit, neo-christianity, ontological categories, doctrine.

THE CONCEPT OF "IDEA"
IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES OF P.V. KOPNIN

The investigation is aimed at the philosophical studies of P.V. Kopnin, which were attempts to justify the Marxist interpretation of social processes in the conditions of the spread of criticism of Stalinism. The philosopher tried to restore the authority of the philosophical theory of building a socialist society in the USSR after an open critique of the practice of its creation at the time of Stalin's cult of personality. Kopnin, which was the head of the Faculty of Philosophy at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, initiated a new tradition of philosophizing, that was focused on the scientific principles of a person's attitude to reality. Defining dialectic as a scientific approach, he created the idea of a human connection with the surrounding world, it being deliberately changed by a person, as a step towards liberation of people and their freedom. His suggestion was to consider scientific and technological progress not as a connection between people and their social organization, but rather as a connection between people and nature, allowed to interpret the scientific idea as a human account of the laws presented with descriptions of the recurring phenomena of interconnections. The idea in its essence represents the strategy of transforming knowledge into reality. This means that the idea acts as a condition of the individual and social movement to a "true history" (according to K. Marx), which allows to determine the existence of human by means of the concept of "freedom". Thus, Hegel's proposal to determine the movement towards freedom through the "absolute idea", operating in history through social organizations, is replaced by the idea of organizing the forces of nature by people. Therefore, society can be self-identified as perfect ("ideal", "communism").

**Keywords:** Hegel, Idea, Ideals, Perfect, P.V. Kopnin, K. Marx, Marxist Philosophy, Science.

Actuality. The well-known influence of the philosophical studies of V.P. Kopnin on the development of Kyiv philosophical school and Ukrainian current philosophical thought requires analysis that is impartial to the traditional views and style of Marxist philosophy. This task must be carried out by new generations of philosophers, formed within the Post-Marxist period.
It should also be noted that Kopnin’s focusing on scientific research process is considered to be up-to-date. In addition, almost all solved by Kopnin problems got their new meaning in comparison with the interpretations in literature of that times.

**Investigation of the problem.** The ideas of P. Kopnin were on the periphery of scientific attention during the period of Perestroika (1985-1991), disaster of socialism in the USSR and establishment of capitalism in the former Soviet republics. Only in the last 10-15 years, we can observe a gradual increase of interest in it. In the universities, several conferences were held and articles were written about the heritage of this philosopher (Kononov I. F., Konversky A. M., Loi A. N., Popovich A. M., Tabachkovsky V. G., Shynkaruk B. A., Lectorovsky V.A. and others). In Russia, a book about Kopnin was published. It was edited by Popovich M. V., the director of the Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. P. V. Kopnin’s works also attracted attention of Chinese researchers (Lee Cande).

**Formulation of the problem:** to clarify the meaning of the concept of “idea” in the philosophical studies of P.V. Kopnin.

**Working hypothesis:** P.V. Kopnin’s philosophical studies are attempts to justify Marxist interpretation of social processes in the conditions of the spread of criticism of Stalinism.

**Discussion.** P.V. Kopnin is guided by the following ideas. One of the peculiarities of non-material (spiritual) production is the fact that its products can be relatively independent and in some sense separated from the person producing them. Materializing in the form of language (text), material things, that are made by people, and spiritual production has double relation to its creator, uplifts its creator, it opposes him as a stranger and is independent from their world. This feature is fixed by the concepts of "objectification" and "alienation" [8, p. 76-78]. Such alienation of knowledge from its creator is not objectification, it is transformation of the results of cognition into ideology that, under certain social conditions, distorts the interpretation of the phenomena of reality and imposes pseudoscientific ideas on other spheres of social activity. As a result, the world of things, that was created by people is opposed to them and reigns over them.

In understanding advancement of the scientific and technological revolution, there is a number of more private, professional problems that require making science the object of careful scientific analysis [2, p. 20-24].

Proceeding from the famous statement of F.Engels that dialectics is the science of the general laws of the development of nature, society and thinking, and well known Lenin’s statement that dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge are the same, Kopnin formulates his own understanding of the subject of Marxist philosophy as science about correlations of thinking and being. At the same time, in scientific philosophy, the unity of thinking and being is not simply postulated on the basis of meaning of the word "to be", but established in essence, because thinking is considered as a form of reflection of being in which being is interpreted and recognized. The reflection of nature in human consciousness is not a frozen or a dead copy of reality, but a process of deepening in the essence of things. Therefore, the establishment of laws and principles of being in the philosophy of Kopnin becomes a method, logic, and the forms of life, after it is recognized by human, becomes laws and forms of thinking [9, p. 321].

Human is in the center of Kopnin’s philosophy. For human practical activity is necessary to know the objective world and the tendencies of development of its phenomena. Therefore, philosophy seeks to know existence not only as being, but also as a result of practical activity of a person. Thus, the existence is perceived through due, but the due is based on knowledge of objective reality, the laws of its movement, especially of human society, since society is "the highest and the most mature form of development, and knowledge of the higher is the starting point for understanding the lower" [2, with. 4].

The cognitive process has pragmatic aspects, since the subject of knowledge is always prone to specific world-view, ideological positions of a particular society [1]. Thus, when a person makes some discoveries, according to Kopnin, the whole society becomes a carrier of certain social relations. Accordingly, the subject of knowledge is a historical and generic creature, not an abstraction of "human as it is". Accordingly, the object of knowledge is historical. Actually, the object of knowledge is not the whole objective reality, but only involved in the field of human activity part of reality. As a result, the opposite of the object of knowledge is not consciousness, but the subject, which transforms things and phenomena of objective reality into the objects of activity [8, p. 71-73]. The presence of contradictions
between the subject and the object is the essence of the cognitive process. The procedure of solving this
ccontradiction involves the interaction of sensory and rational, empirical and theoretical levels of cognition.
As a result of the interaction of levels of cognition, full functioning of the mind, that aimed at forming not
only information about the world, but also the genesis of knowledge about the world in the form of
concept and theory, becomes possible [1].

The result of the solution of the contradiction between the subject and the object of cognition is the
philosophical truth, which, as its continuation, has the transformation of nature and social life. Therefore,
the truth in philosophy is not something ready, frozen, but an active and constant changing desire of the
subject to comprehend the essence of the recognizable object, which is constantly changing. As a result of
this desire we have knowledge that reveals any aspect of the object and becomes the basis for further,
deeper understanding of it, requires going beyond the scope of the result. Truth in this sense is a constant
process of solving the contradiction between the subject and the object. In this process the subject and
object are not in the abstract, but in a concrete identity, therefore, knowledge does not divide them, but
binds them. Thus, the subject and object interact with one another through the truth, which is both
subjective and objective: the truth is subjective, because it arises as a result of human activity, and at the
same time it is objective, because it contains information about the essence of the object of knowledge.

The truth, that is embodied in the theory, appears as a perfect image of reality and knowledge about the
world as a subject of the theory. But only in the knowledge itself there is no desire to realize it because
people not only increase the amount of knowledge, but also transform the world according to their own
standards. Therefore, people who know the reality, seek to create the world they need. Transformation
of knowledge into reality implies genesis of ideas and transition of theory to the idea. The idea as a form of
thinking is a strategy of transforming knowledge into reality. In this sense the idea represents unity of truth
(object that is created by the theory) and the plan of transformation truth into reality.

To become an idea, truth must be come subjective and take form of goals and aspirations of the
subject. However, as soon as the truth in the form of an idea receives relation to subjectivity, it
immediately begins to acquire the status of objective reality. In this regard Kopnin P.V. observes that the
idea is “the end of knowledge and the beginning of things” [4, p. 242-244]. The idea is realized not only in
practical activity, but also theoretically. Realization of the idea in theoretical activity transforms the truth
into a system. Truth does not act as a separate episode in the cognitive process, but as knowledge which
has found its place in the strategy of theoretical assimilation in reality and includes not only the truth, but
also a set of emotions, desires, feelings, states of the soul, which accompany objectification of the idea.
This characteristic of the idea distinguishes a person from a soulless machine. Therefore, a person does
not only create right things, but feels inspiration in this process. This feeling is stimulated by beauty.

Exploring the stages of the process of finding the truth, Kopnin P.V. concluded that the starting point
of scientific research is a fact, defined as a form of human knowledge that has some credibility, and facts
serve as the basis for constructing its theoretical system. The purpose of gathering facts is to satisfy
specific practical needs, the satisfaction of which is a problem. So the problem statement is the beginning
of a scientific study. The problem grows from the previous results of cognition as their original logical
consequence, so the problem itself is a system of various knowledge, which includes previously
established facts, thoughts about the possibility of solving problems. This system is a set of judgments, the
central one is the judgment-question. In this judgment-question it is expressed and transformed into a
cognition [4, p. 246-248].

Considering the problem as the initial moment of scientific research, the researcher understands the
need of scientific knowledge systematization at any stage of research conducting. The systematization of
knowledge is not a simple combination of individual concepts, judgments, inferences, mechanical joining
them to each other, but it is a synthesis in its highest form. Therefore, understanding the essence of
scientific knowledge systematization and its forms is associated with the interpretation of the nature of
synthesis and its relation to analysis.

According to Kopnin, the objective basis of analytical and synthetic processes in cognition is the
presence of a variety of forms of the motion of matter in their essential, internal and necessary unity.
Cognition must reflect the nature of the objective world, which means diversity in a single and unique
notion, so the need to decompose and unite grows. Therefore, analysis and synthesis are creative, their
results are the movement of our knowledge forward [5, p. 243]. We can not imagine cognitive processes in this form: initially, analysis (without synthesis), and then synthesis based on the results of analysis. The connection of analysis and synthesis is organic, internal, because when analytical process is carried out simultaneously with the synthetical. Thus, analytic and synthetic activity is mutual and necessary processes of any act of thinking.

The theory is called a large area of knowledge, which describes and explains the totality of phenomena gives knowledge of the real grounds of all the proposed propositions and reduces the discovered laws to a single and unifying beginning. Applying for empiricism, Kopnin believes that in order to become a theory, knowledge must achieve a certain degree of maturity: the theory must include not only a description of a known set of facts, but also their explanation, disclosure of regularities. Moreover, propositions about the regularities of facts is united by one common beginning, which reflects the fundamental regularity of the given subject and performs the main synthesis function in theory which links all incoming provisions (and descriptions with explanations) into a single whole. Finally, it is necessary to justify it in the theory provisions.

The theory is the form of knowledge that can serve as a scale for assessing the maturity of all other systems. Scientific research serves as a prototype of the theory. Scientists build a peculiar theoretical system, which is an empty theory, in which the question is the unifying principle. When the answer for this question is found, the system of knowledge, that created the problem, will become a scientific theory [8, p. 231-248]. But the path to this is very long, and it runs through the hypothesis. Thus, according to Kopnin, the next form of development of scientific knowledge is a hypothesis.

Logical analysis of the hypothesis describes it as a statement, that forms a system of knowledge, which consists of judgments and inferences, which is different in its characteristics. First of all, it consists of reliable judgments, which make up its base, foundation. Any assumption has its value when it is based on previously established facts and laws.

By its nature, the hypothesis includes problematic judgments. Problematic judgment is a judgment, where truth or false has not yet been proved, but these problematic judgments should not be arbitrary assumptions; their probability must be substantiated by previous proved knowledge. In connection with this, there is a question about the truth and falsity of scientific hypotheses [3, p. 68-76].

For Kopnin there can be no doubts about scientific hypothesis achieving objective and true knowledge of the world and providing objective and true knowledge about the laws of the external world, the meaning of which does not depend on either human or humanity. Like any other form of objectively-true knowledge about the world around us, the hypothesis is not a mirror or dead image of reality, but an active and creative process of reflecting the world. The differences between various hypotheses consist only in the completeness of the object's coverage, in the degree of accuracy of its reflection [4, p. 185-187].

In order to distinguish the cognitive value of different types of hypotheses we have the notion of working hypothesis. The working hypothesis is usually called one of the first explanations of phenomenon that is suitable for a given period of time as an instrument for further study of an object. When a scientist constructs a working hypothesis, the main thing is not the correctness or the wrong explanation of the process, but what this hypothesis gives for further analysis of this process, how it helps the researcher to direct his / her opinion to a more detailed and in-depth study of the subject. Thus, the working hypothesis is a purely temporal construction that defines the purpose of the process of detecting and describing phenomena. Having constructed this hypothesis, scientists, directed by deduction, are looking for those facts and phenomena, if the content of the hypothesis is corresponded to reality. And if these facts do not manifest, then the researcher builds a new working hypothesis, and sometimes not only one [3, p. 75-76]. The difference between working and real hypotheses is relative. Relation is manifested, in particular, in the process of knowledge, one passes to another.

Hypotheses provide scientific clarity and simplicity, which without their assumption can be difficult to achieve. Often the hypothesis is still understood not as the whole system of knowledge that arose to explain the subject of study, but only the assumption. Thus, the concept of hypotheses is narrowed to judgment-assumptions. Considering that this restriction is illegitimate, because it considers the hypothesis not as a process of thinking, but only as a result, Kopnin P.V. proved that this assumption contributes to
the development of knowledge what enables to construct a system of knowledge that leads to new results. Heuristic value of the assumption is that it connects previously known to the unknown.

Assumptions in the hypothesis should be proved, and the degree of its evidence may be different. The scientific hypothesis represents a whole system of provisions, some of which are certain, and others are probable. Probable positions are in a certain logical connection with the certaint. On the other hand, reliability does not exclude probability [4, p. 235-237], therefore, the probable on the basis of evidence passes into a certain, and certain generates probable.

Thus, probability does not characterize the objective content of the judgment, but it characterizes the assessment of the degree of its validity, evidence. Probability directly expresses the logical relation of the judgment, the truth of which is established. Changing (increasing or decreasing) the degree of probability of judgment does not mean any changes in its objective content. Similarly, mistakes are identification of certainty with truth, and mistake with the non-availability of probability: certainty and probability characterizes not only the content of knowledge, but the degree, the level of its evidence [5, p. 348].

Regardless of the way hypothesis arises, its nomination and justification is connected with the application of various forms of reasoning, without which it is impossible to generalize previous knowledge: analogies, induction in its various forms, and deductions. In the process of formation, justification and verification of the hypothesis it is used not a single type of inference. Analogy as the discovery of similarity, as a rule, gives rise to an impulse to assume an assumption. Since the hypothesis can never be based on a single fact, the role of induction in the hypothesis becomes apparent. The process of further justification and strengthening of the hypothesis, transition from one to another, from hypothesis to theory, is unthinkable without deduction. Deductive testing of hypotheses is necessary because analogy and usual incomplete induction alone can not provide certain conclusions [8, p. 150-151]. There are also certain moments in the arising of hypotheses, which are difficult to explain, so these factors are denoted as beyond-logical. One of these beyond-logical factors is a guess. At first, a new opinion appears in the form of an assumption, which is often put forward intuitively; imagination does not have the last place in the process of hypothesis, which, however, in scientific research has its limits: it makes sense until it leads to the knowledge of actual properties and patterns of the objective world, and once it goes beyond this limit, then ceases to be a scientific imagination. Therefore, imagination in science is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving and developing knowledge of the true theory [8, p. 263-267].

In rising, development and justification of hypotheses a large role belongs to experiments. With the help of experiments, there is a practical proof of the hypothesis. In the process of practical activity in general and experiment as one of its forms in particular, realization and objectivization of concepts and ideas take place.

In the process of experimentation, the researcher does the same work, but the research of this phenomenon in the "pure" form in the experiment differs from the isolation of the regularities in abstractions: in theoretical thinking the law is cleared from randomness speculatively, in the experiment the clearing is sensually-practical, substantive. In this case, an experiment always arises on the basis of a certain theoretical construction.

Any experiment arises as a materialization of the hypothesis and performs a dual role: 1) the experiment proves previously established theoretical positions; 2) the experiment may have a heuristic meaning, becoming the primary source of new theories and hypotheses. These two sides in the experiment are inextricably linked: proving some knowledge, it is developing at the same time; developing knowledge, it is proving too. But at the same time, the experiment as a means of proof is limited and relative, since it arises on the basis of the achieved level of technology and scientific knowledge. However, the source of knowledge development is not only an experiment that confirmed the theoretical construction, but also an experiment that gave a negative result [6, p. 367-372].

It is known that not only the facts lead to the formulation of theories, but also theories in the course of research become facts. Transformation of the theory into fact means proof of its certainty. But as a rule, this happens after science has already discovered the limitations of these theories and created a new, more perfect one.

There are important epistemological regularities. The theory becomes credible when it essentially died, when science recognized its limitations, set the boundary of development and proceeded further. Further
development of knowledge and practice, proving the reliability of the theory, establishes its limitations. In other words, in order to prove the reliability of the theory, we must go beyond its boundaries and create a new, more perfect one. The developing theory always contains a moment of probability that can become certain only in the latest course of knowledge.

As it was already mentioned, knowledge exists not for itself, but for human practice. For the practical realization of knowledge it is necessary to reach a certain degree of maturity, to become not just a theory, but a scientific idea.

The peculiarity of the idea as a form of reflection of reality lies in the fact that it reflects not a thing or property as they exist, but the development of things in all their bonds and mediations. So it reflects the reality not just in its existence, but in its necessity and possibilities. The idea gripes the tendency of the development of the phenomena of reality, so it reflects not only the existence, but also a due.

Thus, the idea appears to be a kind of epistemological ideal, to which a person aspires in his movement of knowledge. After all, the task of knowledge is the achievement of knowledge, in which the thought in its content merges with objectivity. The idea is a form of thinking where this coincidence is achieved. Therefore, the idea is an epistemological ideal in the development of knowledge in a particular field. In this sense, under the ideas we must understand such results of knowledge, which determine the development of science of this historical time.

So the idea is a historically transitional ideal in cognition. Leading in the development of ideas, as well as any other form of human knowledge, there is a contradiction in its content between subjective and objective. This contradiction with each step of its motion is solved and arises again. If an idea stops in its development, being proclaimed an absolute ideal of knowledge, it will perish as a scientific idea.

The idea is a synthesized knowledge of individual aspects of an object, otherwise it will not be an idea. Being a kind of synthesis, the idea carries out a synthesizing function in the development of scientific knowledge. On its basis, there is an ascension from the abstract to the concrete. This process is the movement of thought from one content to another, where some abstraction develops, enriched with new content, grabs the other sides of the subject. The multiplicity of definitions in a particular thinking does not arise from the combination of different abstractions, but as the development of a particular abstraction (for example, the axioms - a position adopted without proof), which contain all the wealth of the following definitions. The latter, reaching maturity, receiving some relative independence, erase their origin from some initial abstraction. This initial abstraction, which develops in the ascension process from abstract to concrete, serves as the beginning of the emergence of an idea. The emergence on its basis of other abstractions and ideas means the formation and development of a new idea [2, p. 135-153].

There are no abstraction, taken separately, including the one that is served as the starting point of the ascension, is an idea. The idea lies in each of it. These are just moments of the idea's development. It does not provide possibilities of separation from theory, isolation and consideration as something independent and external in relation to the system of knowledge created on its basis, because the idea exists in the theory and is revealed in it. This idea was already presented in Hegel's works.

The idea, according to Kopnin, is the boundary of scientific theory insofar as the change of ideas means and change of theories and development of theory is associated with the development of the idea. When researcher solves the question to which theory refers this or that concept, the criterion is its relation to the idea. Moreover, the concept acquires its importance in science when it acts in the system with others as the moment of formation and development of the idea.

Since all concepts in scientific theory are related to the idea, it expresses its various moments, the disclosure of the content of the idea can not be realized in the form of a separate definition, it requires a set of definitions that would characterize it from different sides [7, p. 126]. The idea is revealed in the system of concepts, definitions, because it is a "notion of concepts". The first and most general definition of it is the principle, therefore, it serves as the starting point in the construction and presentation of scientific theory. If the position of scientific theory is described hierarchically, then the lower end will rely on facts, or rather, into judgments, their registration and description, and the upper is in the principle [10, p. 356-359]. Thus, the principle is the upper limit of the generalization of a certain theory.

Facts and principles are two extreme poles in theory, each of which is necessary for the theory. The idea that is revealed in the theory and stands concrete in thinking is a negation of both, but at the same
time it involves the existence of both facts and principles. The principle requires idea as one of its definitions. He also performs a certain synthesizing function, since it is the moment of an idea, its one-sided, extreme-abstract expression.

Scientific methods are based on the idea. Scientific method of cognition arises only on the basis of some system of knowledge that has its center. A separate position can not act as a method of cognition, because on its basis it is impossible to give a concrete analysis of the investigated process. The development of the method of knowledge means not finding new examples, illustrations that confirm it, but improving the knowledge system that reveals his idea. Ideas in science play the role of methods explaining phenomena and subsequent movement of knowledge [5, p. 264-272].

Therefore, in contrast to other forms of knowledge, the idea is characterized by direct connection with practical action. In the idea such a degree of maturity is reached, that it is embodied through material, practical activity in life, in reality. The object is the objective content of the idea. Moreover, in the idea the reflection of the object achieves extremely objective and complete, and on the basis of objectively and truly knowledge of the subject and the regularities of its development, it is transformed with the help of material practical activity. The idea (through the definition of possible) shows to the subject the imperfection of the object and thus substantiates in theory the necessity of its change. As a result of the practical interaction between the subject and the object there is a change of the last one. Therefore, objective reality is the beginning and end of an idea: at first, the idea derives its content from the objective world, then with the help of practice this content becomes one of the concrete forms of objective reality. However, there is always a discrepancy between the idea and its practical implementation: practice, on the one hand, is unable to fully realize existing ideas, and on the other hand, it always goes further, always giving new comparison with what was in those ideas from which it came out. This actually makes practice the basis of cognition, a criterion of truth, a means of gaining human freedom as an act of creativity.

Thus, the idea contains several points that distinguish it among all other forms of knowledge: 1) in it the concentrated form of the expressed achievements of scientific knowledge; 2) within it, it contains the desire for practical realization to its material embodiment, the affirmation of oneself; 3) the idea contains knowledge about herself, the ways and means of its objectification, is the plan of action of the subject [10, p. 360-366].

Taking into account that the indicated Kopnin’s understanding the place and role of an idea in the socio-historical practice associated with the concept of "idea" in the philosophy of Hegel, the difference in their interpretation is given. According to Hegel, the idea shows the way to freedom through the recognition the need to make changes in the social structure of human existence and to change the form of social organization in the process of moving the path to freedom. According to Kopnin, the idea determines knowledge about the ways and means of its objectification, which a person, who guided by it as an ideal, must realize, and which gives a way from the realm of the necessity to the realm of free existence. When he defines the scientific and technological progress as the subject field of objectification, he contextually forms the ideology of the opposition of human and nature, agreeing that the human issues of the social system of human existence have already been resolved in the form of a socialist system.

Conclusions. Considering scientific and technological progress as a connection between human and nature, the scientific idea is advanced by Kopnin taking into account the laws presented by descriptions of the recurring phenomena of interconnections. That is, the idea of Kopnin appears to be the condition for the movement of human, society to a "real history" (according to K. Marx), which allows to define human existence with the help of the concept of "freedom". Thus Hegel's proposal to determine the movement towards freedom through an "absolute idea" that operates in history through social organizations, is replaced by the idea of the organization of nature by human forces. Accordingly, society can be self-identified as perfect ("ideal", "communism").

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**Настасія Чуйко**

Досліджуються філософські студії П. В. Копніна як спроби випРАдати марксистське тлумачення соціальних процесів за умови поширення критики сталінізму. Намагаючись відновити авторитет філософського питання у СРСР після відкритої критики практики його створення за часів культу особистості Сталина, П. В. Копнін, який очолював філософський факультет КДУ ім. Т. Г. Шевченка, започаткував нову традицію філософського дослідження, зосередившись на визначенні наукових засад ставлення людини до дійсності. Пропозиція визначити науково-технічний прогрес як зв’язок людини з природою, а не з її сусільною організацією, дозволила витлумачити наукову ідею як урахування людиною законів і явищ при перетворенні сутніго на належне. Осмислюючи сутність через належне, ідея як форма мислення за своєю суттю виражає стратегію перетворення знання у дійсність. Тобто ідея у Копніна постає умовою руху людини, суспільства до «дійсної історії» (за К. Марксом), яка дозволяє визначати людське існування за допомогою поняття «свобода».

Тим самим пропозиція Гегеля визначити рух до свободи через «абсолютну ідею», що діє в історії через суспільні організації, замінюється на ідею організації людиною сили природи.

Відповідно суспільство може самовизначатись як досконале («ідеальне», «комунізм»).

**Ключові слова:** Гегель, ідея, ідеали, П. В. Копнін, К. Маркс, марксистська філософія, наука.

Надійшла до редакції 23.04.2018 р.